The Industry of the Living Dead: A Critical Look at Disability Insurance by Schulze, David
Journal of Law and Social Policy
Volume 9 Article 7
1993
The Industry of the Living Dead: A Critical Look at
Disability Insurance
David Schulze
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Social Policy by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Schulze, David. "The Industry of the Living Dead: A Critical Look at Disability Insurance." Journal of Law and Social Policy 9. (1993):
192-221.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol9/iss1/7
THE INDUSTRY OF THE LIVING DEAD:
A Critical Look at Disability Insurance
DAvID SCIIULZE*
R#SuME
L'industrie de l'assurance fait r~f6rence A l'invalidit6 h long terme comme s'il
s'agissait d'une situation de mort vivant, puisque, selon l'opinion des ac-
tuaires, cela est pire que la mort. Ainsi, la personne handicap~e est priv~e de
revenu mais a des d~penses de subsistance similaires ou plus 6lev~es A celles
d'une personne qui n'est pas handicap6e. Cet article 6tudie le sort de per-
sonnes handicap~es qui sont oblig~es de laisser le monde du travail. Il 6tudie
6galement le dossier de l'industrie de l'assurance, la gestion des sinistres, la
non-observation des r~glements de la cour, la philosophie de la gestion des
sinistres, l'utilisation des prestations vers~es par le gouvernement, la r6gle-
mentation du Surintendant des assurances et la n~cessit: d'une r6forme au sein
de cette industrie.
INTRODUCTION
Anne Corr's 27-year career as a nursing assistant ended one day in January
1980 when she had a heart attack while lifting a patient. Not only was her
heart left functioning at about half its normal capacity, her doctors prescribed
a regular course of medication that included a diuretic, which caused frequent
and uncontrolled urination, a potassium supplement causing diarrhoea and
Valium, which she said left her dazed and a little "high."
* Copyright © 1993 David Schulze. David Schulze received his LL.B from Osgoode
Hall Law School. Toronto, 1993. He is currently completing a Bachelor of Civil Law at
L'Universit6 de Montreal. The author would like to thank the staff and students at
Parkdale Community Legal Services in Toronto for giving him the opportunity to learn
about these issues first hand in the spring semester of 1992. Special thanks are due to
Sheila Cuthbertson for her inspired and inspiring supervision.
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When Anne Corr applied for early payment of her death benefit under the
disability instalment provision of the group plan at the Fishermen's Memorial
Hospital in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, the London Life Insurance Company
turned her down. In the company's view, Corr did not qualify as
"totally and permanently disabled by accident, injury or disease, so as to be
permanently continuously and wholly prevented thereby from engaging in
any occupation and from performing any work for compensation or profit for
the remainder of [her] life...."
This paper is about an industry that made it necessary for Corr to appear before
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court's Trial Division in order to receive the
$30,000 owed to her under the policy.
1
H. THE PATCHWORK OF DISABILITY INCOME PROGRAMS
The insurance industry refers to long-term disability as "living death," since in
the actuarial view it is worse than dying: the disabled person is deprived of
income but left with the same or higher living expenses as an able-bodied
person.2 For a large number of disabled people, their physical condition also
means a life of economic deprivation: a 1986 survey found that 63 percent of
the disabled had annual incomes of less than $10,000 and a labour force
participation rate in 1983-84 of only 48 percent, compared to a national
average of 75 percent.
3
This paper considers the fate only of those whom disability has forced to leave
the work force, but it is important to remember there are many more who have
never been able to enter it. The Social Assistance Review Committee esti-
mated that a comprehensive disability insurance system for wage-earners in
1. Corr v. London Life Insurance Co, (1983) 3 C.C.L.I. 232 (N.S. S.C. [T.D.]). It
should be said that Anne Corr's doctor reported she could return to light work, as
the president of the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association was anxious to
point out in his reply to my article "Disability insurance? Just try to collect" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 April 1993). See: Mark R. Daniels, "There's a duty to
pay only legitimate claims" The Globe and Mail (3 May 1993). However, given all
her other symptoms and that her doctor also admitted she had discomfort perform-
ing ordinary daily activities, it is unclear why the insurer should have accepted this
view so readily.
2. Canada, Status of Disabled Persons Secretariat, Obstacles: Recommendations for-
mulated and progress assessed by the Special Committee on the Disabled and the
Handicapped (Ottawa: Secretary of State, 1985) at 83.
3. Canada, Secretary of State, Profile of Disabled Persons in Canada (Ottawa: 1986)
at 18-20, cited in Sherri Torman, Income Insecurity: The Disability Income System
in Canada (Toronto: G. Allan Roeher Institute, 1988) at 5.
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Ontario would benefit fewer than 25 percent of the 90,000 disabled recipients
of social assistance.4 In addition, only an estimated 43 percent of Canadian
workers are covered by private group disability insurance plans. 5
If impairment of a psychological or physical function forces a wage-earner to
leave the labour market, she has very few guarantees of income replacement,
though the list of potential sources is extensive. A worker in Ontario may be
eligible under any of the following publicly-created plans: Workers' Compen-
sation benefits; Veteran's disability pensions; Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
disability benefits; Unemployment Insurance (LUI) sick benefits; statutory no-
fault automobile insurance benefits delivered by private insurers; Criminal
Injuries Compensation Board benefits; the Guaranteed Annual Income System
for the Disabled (GAINS-D) from social assistance.
In addition, a disabled worker may have the right to sue if she was the victim
of negligence or assault; to claim a disability pension under a private pension
plan; to receive benefits from a life insurance policy in regular but limited
instalments under a disability provision (as Anne Corr attempted to do); to
receive benefits under a private long- or short-term disability insurance plan.
Most wage-earners are eligible for benefits from the Workers' Compensation
Board, but only when they suffer their injuries in the course of employment
and Paul Weiler has argued the scheme tends to miss those suffering from
disease, as opposed to victims of traumatic injury.6 The most readily available
of the other disability benefits are those offered by the Canada Pension Plan.
All employed and self-employed persons who have made sufficient contribu-
tions are eligible, with the contributory period adjusted to include those kept
out of the labour force temporarily by disability or childrearing.
But recipients are not entitled to CPP disability benefits until they are suffering
from a "severe and prolonged mental or physical disability" which is "of
indefinite duration" or likely to be fatal and which renders them "incapable
of regularly pursuing any substantially gainful occupation." 7 This strict
4. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 13 May 1988, at 103-104 (Chair: G. Thomson) [hereinafter
Transitions].
5. Canada, Joint Federal-Provincial Study of A Comprehensive Disability Protection
Program, Stage III Report: Program Design Options (Ottawa: Health and Welfare
Canada, 1985) at 1, as cited in Transitions at 107.
6. C. Weiler, Protecting the Worker from Disability: Challenges for the Eighties (Toronto:
Ministry of Labour, 1983) at 10, 16, 50, 56-57.
7. Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-8, s.44.
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definition of disability precludes those capable of recovery and thus precludes
the program having a rehabilitative purpose.8
The CPP disability benefits are also not particularly generous, with a maxi-
mum level in 1991 of $743.64 per month.9 Yet the most recent study of
recipients illustrates that though inadequate, the benefits are essential to their
incomes. The maximum benefit was only $216.06 per month in 1980 (or
$2,592.72 annually), but the benefits were their recipients' main source of
support in 1979 and counted for 32 percent of the group's total income, which
averaged only $7,082.10
III. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S RECORD
One might imagine that the obvious inadequacy of public disability benefits
and the insurance industry's own view of disability as "living death" would
spur it to the speedy processing of claims. Unfortunately, the experience of
Anne Corr suggests that, if anything, the opposite is true. When Justice Coulter
Osborne investigated automobile insurance in Ontario in 1988, he reserved
some of his harshest words for the private insurer's performance in delivering
disability benefits to accident victims:
"The insurance industry's performance in this area is nothing short of abysmal. I
concede at the outset that there are some insurers who do deliver disability
benefits reasonably promptly; most do not." 11
The provision of these benefits has been studied because automobile insurance
has been the subject of intense political debate and law reform in Ontario
during the past 15 years and disability benefits are now part of the compulsory,
no-fault coverage required in automobile insurance policies under Ontario
statute.12
8. A study of public long-term disability programs in eight industrialized countries found
only Canada and the United Kingdom required a total inability to earn income and
only their plans had no linkage to providers of vocational rehabilitation: Ilene R.
Zeitzer and Laurel E. Beedon, "Long-Term Disability Programs in Selected Countries,"
(September 1987) 50 Social Security Bulletin at 13, 15.
9. L E. Coward, Mercer Handbook of Canadian Pension and Benefit Plans (North
York: CCH Canadian Limited, 1991) at 189.
10. Health and Welfare Canada, Research Note, No. 1 (1982), "Survey of Canada Pension
Plan Disability Benefit Recipients."
11. Ontario, Report of the Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Ontario,
(Toronto: Ministry of Financial Institutions, 1988) vol. 1 at 166.
12. InsuranceAct, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, pt. VI [hereinafter theAct].
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By contrast, very little investigation has been done into the practices of
companies providing other forms of disability coverage. The scattered evid-
ence on their performance provides no reason to believe disability insurers are
any more diligent, though most are life insurance companies which are wealth-
ier and better-capitalized than the general (or property and casualty) insurers
writing automobile policies. The Ontario Superintendent of Insurance reported
to a Legislative Assembly committee in 1981 that it had received some 80
complaints about accident and sickness insurance the previous year, largely
related to the termination and refusal of disability claims. 13 A Canadian Life
and Health Insurance Association spokesman admitted to Maclean's in 1987
that among the 250 written complaints received concerning its member com-
panies in 1986, the most common complaint was about "health claims-and
by far the most difficult is disability. ' 14
A study of reported disability insurance cases suggests an industry actively
resisting claims which the courts later uphold. A search of cases in the Domin-
ion Reports Service database dealing with disability insurance, but not with
automobile or motor vehicle insurance, generated 61 common law cases from
1969 to 1989. In and of itself, this is disturbing: industry statistics indicate
5.525 million Canadians were insured under long-term disability policies in
1989. Even accounting for disputes settled through other means and before
actions went to court, the number of cases litigated suggests a very low rate of
appeal of insurance company decisions. The comparable CPP disability bene-
fit, to which roughly twice as many Canadians are entitled, generated 11,226
appeals from refusals in 1987 alone.15 This seems to indicate the discouraging
effect of requiring legal action as the final appeal, compared to a cost-free
publicly-run process.
13. Ontario, Select Committee on Company Law, The Insurance Industry; Fifth Report
on Accident and Sickness Insurance (Toronto: Legislative Assembly, 1981) at 122.
14. Diane Francis, "The tangle of disability claims" (14 December 1987) 100 Maclean's 11.
15. Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, Canadian Life and Health Insur-
ance Facts (Toronto, 1991) at 45; Canada, House of Commons Debates (18 April
1988).
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TABLE I
Cases on Disability Insurance from The Dominion Reports Service,
1969-1989
Total cases: 65
less 4 civil law cases
6 cases not involving insurer
Total sample: 55
less 6 cases in which insurer was plaintiff
(10.9 %)
sub-total: 49 cases in which insured party was plaintiff
(89.1%)
less 5 procedural decisions




In summary, the sample of cases suggests litigation over disability benefits is
overwhelmingly commenced by the potential beneficiaries, who are over-
whelmingly successful in court. Excluding six cases in which the disability
insurer was not a party (wrongful dismissal, tax and family law cases), left a
sample of 55 cases. The insurers were the plaintiff in only six: two of subroga-
tion and four in which they sued beneficiaries to recover disability payments
(only two of these were successful). The insured party was the plaintiff suing
for benefits in fully 49 cases, principally under employer-sponsored group
plans, but also individual and credit insurance policies; these plaintiffs won in
35 cases and lost in only nine (the remainder were on procedure). This success
rate is striking in view of the vast difference in resources between insurance
companies, many of whom have staff counsel and retain the most expensive
private firms, while the claimants largely live on low, limited incomes.
As will be illustrated below, a qualitative examination of the cases makes it
impossible to attribute the high success rate for plaintiff beneficiaries simply
to a process of self-selection, in which only the most justified claims are
litigated.
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IV. "LITIGATE, ARBITRATE, SEITLE OR SURRENDER":
THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE DISABILITY
INSURANCE CLAIMS
1. How insurers administer claims
The cases reveal a consistent pattern of bad faith in the insurers' treatment of
disability claimants. All of the following cases were won by the plaintiff
beneficiaries:
A claims officer at Crown Life Insurance determined a pharmacist's severe
hearing impairment had not permanently disabled him based on a single
telephone conversation.16
Mutual of Omaha offered a 51-year-old former janitor in Vancouver a job
as a security guard in another city, though he suffered from chronic obstruc-
tive lung disease, took heavy medication, used a respirator, and tired after
walking more than a block.
17
Great-West Life denied long-term disability benefits to a woman suffering
from a condition her doctors had difficulty diagnosing, but which they were
sure was organic in origin. It left her suffering from excess sweating,
shivering, chills, headaches, nausea and vomiting, fatigue, weakness and
shortness of breath. A psychiatrist hired by the company determined its
cause was her neurotic personality after a single examination.
18
National Life received a report from an independent rehabilitative medicine
specialist that a claimant with degenerative disc disease had chronic pain
which was an "over-response" and needed rehabilitation. The company then
advised her solicitor it would not release its medical reports and that they
contained little evidence she was totally disabled. Instead, an officer of the
company offered her a lump-sum settlement, since her problem "can be
summarized by saying that she has become accustomed to collecting dis-
ability benefits and probably does not want to go back into the work force
in any capacity."
19
16. Malkin v. Crown Life Insurance Co. (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 296 (B.C.S.C.).
17. Braun v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., [1987] I.L.R. 1-2181 (B.C. S.C.).
18. Snook v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., [19901 I.L.R. 1-2634 (B.C.S.C.). Not
reported in the judgment is the fact that the diagnosis-which the trial judge called"superficial"-was essential to terminating benefits because the policy covered
organic sickness and psychosis, but not psychoneurotic or behavioural disorders:
"Undiagnosed illness held to be organic in origin" (Sept. 1990) 10 Decisions (Cana-
dian Health and Life Insurance Association) 3 at 4.
19. Wright v. National Life Assurance Co. of Canada (1987), 25 C.C.L.I. 1 (Ont. S.C.).
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" Mutual of Omaha received a report from an independent medical examiner
that a mechanic who had been backed up onto by a truck should receive
retraining for a trade which would not require him to sit or stand for long
periods. "I appreciate these restrictions are severe and might fail," the doctor
wrote. "That should be kept in mind regarding disability payments." The
company then advised the claimant it no longer considered him totally dis-
abled, but would pay him one more year's benefits if he agreed to follow a
rehabilitation program.
20
" Imperial Life ignored two independent medical assessments that the owner
of a hairdressing salon was totally disabled after developing an ossification
of the muscles in his leg and resulting pain. Instead, it hired a rehabilitation
consultant who determined he could work in telephone marketing or as a
host in a restaurant or lounge, though he had learned English as an adult
and had a Grade Five education; she based this conclusion on the availabi-
lity of government programs to modify workplaces for the disabled.
21
A recently closed file at Parkdale Community Legal Services provides
further evidence of the insurance industry's methods. The client was a nursing
assistant who left her job because of severe rheumatoid arthritis. Following a
medical examination, the doctor selected by the insurer reported to the
company:
"I see this lady as being genuinely, medically, necessarily and totally disabled
from performing the essential duties of her former occupation outlined in the
job duty statement form. [...]
I see this lady as an excellent candidate for a rehabilitation or retraining program
to some lighter duty employment. But I am only able to say this is possible
because her arthritis has been quiet for the last 6 months.
One can best judge the future in rheumatoid arthritis by what has gone [on] in
the past. And the time of successful treatment is only 6 months, therefore it is
difficult to make any hard statements."
Citing the policy's requirement that she be "totally disabled from any occupa-
tion," the insurer terminated her benefits one month later. A claims analyst
wrote to her: "The medical information that we have on file does not clinically
support a disability severe enough to render you totally disabled as defined
above." 22
20. Savoie v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., [1988] I.L.R. 1-2302 (Ont. H.C.).
21. Mercuri v. Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada, [1990] N.B.J. No. 711 (Q.B.).
22. Parkdale Community Legal Services, File No. 370013. A settlement was eventually
negotiated by the clinic after the threat of litigation.
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The insurer's view of claimant service was revealed by the fate of the Paul
Revere Life Insurance Company agent who took the side of one his clients, Mr.
Sucharov, in a disability insurance claim. The company chose to fire the agent
long before Sucharov's case had wound its way to the Supreme Court for a
decision in his favour23 but exactly three months before his pension would
have vested. The trial judge found the company's "real reason" for the firing
had been the agent's support for his client's successful legal action.24
2. ATrRJTION BY LITIGATION:
DISABILITY INsURERS IN COURT
Consistent with the abusive treatment, the concealment and blatant distortion
of information illustrated in the cases cited above, reported decisions also
repeatedly reveal insurance companies' wilful disregard for their claimants'
true situations when denying or terminating benefits. The following cases
were also lost by the insurers:
" Both Laurentian Imperial and Imperial Life Assurance (related companies)
argued that claimants suffering from schizophrenia were not entitled to
benefits because they did not comply with a clause requiring regular care
by a psychiatrist, even though the rejection of medical treatment is a symp-
tom of the illness.
2 5
" The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company argued the fact that a man suf-
fering from a degenerative back disease did some consulting work proved
he was not totally disabled, though he did so in considerable pain and
against his doctor's orders, because he needed to earn a living. 26
" Co-Operative Fire and Casualty maintained that a 42-year-old stenographer
whose chronic back pain made her unable to stand or sit for longer than 30
minutes was still able to perform the duties of an occupation for which she
was reasonably qualified.27
" Paul Rev ere Life Insurance argued that an internist who had ,.vorked 90
hours per week before undergoing a triple bypass operation was not parti-
ally disabled because he could still perform every duty of his work,
23. PaulRevere Life Insurance Co. v. Sucharov, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 541.
24. Mahon v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. (1983), 19 Man. R. (2d) 388 (Q.B.).
25. Seitz v. The Laurentian Imperial Co., [1993] I.L.R. 1-2912 (Ont. Ct. G.D.); Kirkness
Estate v. The ImperialLife Assurance Co. of Canada, [1993] 1-2923 (OnL C.A.)
26. Hiscock v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1989), 223 A.P.R. 126 (Nfld. S.C.).
27. MacEachern v. Co-Operative Fire and Casualty Co. (1987), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 271 (S.C.).
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although he was now restricted to no more than 50 hours of work per
week.
28
Canada Life Assurance argued that a factory worker with a Grade Nine edu-
cation and a degenerative disorder of the spine aggravated by a back injury,
was not totally disabled from work for which he was fitted by training or
experience, because he had attempted to sell jewellery and lost $7,200 on
the venture, and had attempted to drive a truck and a front-end loader, but
gave it up because it caused him pain.
29
These cases indicate the irrelevance of judicial decisions to insurance
company practices. In particular, the grounds for these disputes over the
claimants' total disability are not merely specious, but show a blatant
disregard for the Canadian courts' definition of the term. According to a
leading author:
"It has been established law that 'total disability' does not mean that the
insured must be totally helpless, and that even the ability to perform some
duties of his own occupation, or another occupation not commensurate with
his education, training or experience will not disqualify the insured from
benefits.
The distinction is not between total disability and partial disability, but
between total disability and no disability at all." 3 0
The effect this disregard for established case law can have on a claimant is
illustrated by an open file at Parkdale Community Legal Services: the client
suffered a physical injury at work in December 1990. He was scheduled for the
second of two operations to deal with it in September 1991, when his doctors
learned he had angina and cancelled the surgery. Within weeks the client
applied for long-term disability benefits based on the injury, but was refused
by the insurer because the 90-day period in which to submit a claim had
expired in March 1991.
This constituted the requirement of an impossibility: the client could not know
that his injury had permanently disabled him until he developed angina; in
March he was expecting an operation to remedy it.31 Moreover, the courts had
excluded such impossible requirements as long ago as 1940, ruling that an
insurance claim is not invalidated by a failure to give notice within a specified
28. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Dufton, [1989] I.L.R. 1-2413 (B.C.S.C.).
29. Campbell v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1990), 45 C.C.L.I. 73 (Man. C.A.).
30. D. Norwood, "Issues in Disability Insurance," (1986) 3 C.J.I.L. 115.
31. Parkdale Community Legal Services, File No. 250035.
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time period, if it could not have been given then, and is submitted as soon as is
reasonably possible. 32 The client received his benefits only after intervention
by the clinic, which included the threat of litigation.
If the insurers show little regard for rulings from the courts, the courts for their
part have been extremely deferential to the insurance companies. The only real
penalty ever assessed against their claims-processing practices is costs on the
punitive solicitor and client scale, even though the courts have now decided
claims for tortious damages can be considered under a contract for insurance.
In Thompson v. Zurich Insurance Co.,33 Pennell J. held that insurance is not
actually a commercial contract, but rather for "peace of mind," the security of
knowing one is protected. Thus, he opened the door to punitive damages
against an insurer, but all but slammed it shut again by requiring "evidence of
malice," which exceeded "mere negligence or want of sound judgment or
hasty action." 34
The result, points out Michael Kelly, has been that termination of benefits
based on weak or insufficient evidence has been held not to be enough to
ground punitive damages. He concludes:
"Given the lack of success of punitive damages claims in disability insurance
litigation, it would seem that Canadian courts consider it acceptable for an
insurer to challenge an individual's ongoing claim of disability by terminating
benefits and thus force the claimant to bear the risk and expense of bringing a
lawsuit."
35
In one case, even when National Life ignored a doctor's recommendation of
rehabilitation, kept the report from the claimant's solicitor and accused the
claimant of being unwilling to return to work, the company was found not to
have acted in bad faith.36
32. Price v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co., [1940] 8 I.L.R. 215 (N.B.
T.D.), reversed on other grounds [1941] 7 I.L.R. 351 (C.A.), reversed [1941] 8
I.L.R. 207 (S.C.C.). See also: Grant v. British Pacific Life Insurance Co., [1980]
I.L.R. 1-1225 (N.S. T.D.); Vogt v. Paul Revere Life Insurance (1977), 43 A.P.R.
249 (N.S. T.D.).
33. (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 744.
34. Ibid. 753.
35. M. W. Kelly, "Taking on the Terminator: Issues to Consider When Suing a Disabil-
ity Insurer" [1992] 14 Adv..Q. 308 at 317.
36. Wright v. NationalLife Assurance Co. of Canada (1987), 25 C.C.L.I. 1 (Ont. S.C.).
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3. DISABILITY BENEFITS AS LOSSES AND SURRENDERS:
THE INSURERS' GENERAL THEORY OF CLAIMS
MANAGEMENT
By their own words, insurance companies have demonstrated there is more
than an administrative problem in how claims are dealt with: insurers are
philosophically opposed to paying claims as submitted. An explicit statement
of this can be found in a commentary on the decision in Thompson v. Zurich
Insurance Co. in an industry publication in 1986 by J.C.W. Thompson, a
manager at the Mortgage Insurance Company of Canada (which does not
provide disability insurance).37 In face of a claim, he wrote, an insurer's
choices are to "litigate, arbitrate, settle, or surrender."
According to Thompson: "Insurance companies are mostly forced into litiga-
tion by, first, excessive amounts claimed and, second, by issues of principle
which cannot be ignored." Arbitration as used in the construction industry was
a model he hoped the insurance industry would eventually adopt. Settlement
was only possible with a "valid claim" and a "reasonable quantum for the
injury or damage to the claimant." But the real danger, he wrote, was surrender:
"The reason I included 'surrender' in the title as an alternative to 'settlement'
is because very often the constraints, real or imagined, experienced by an
insurance company cause it to surrender to a claim rather than negotiate a fair
and reasonable settlement or deny it.
One example of this is where a claim (however lacking in merit) is for a sum
which would preclude litigation because of high legal costs, [and] is disposed
of by an ex gratia payment to avoid irritation and administrative personnel
waste." 38
For Thompson, then, paying a claim as submitted is inherently a surrender and
paying the amount claimed could by definition not be a "fair and reasonable
settlement."
Under this philosophy, the claimant has not merely the onus the courts impose
of establishing her entitlement to benefits, but actually has the benefit of the
doubt applied against her. Thompson explained:
" ...There is undoubtedly much evidence in the files of insurance companies
to indicate a public propensity to (a) make invalid claims and (b) ask for more
than the injury is worth.
37. J.C.W. Thompson, "Litigate, Arbitrate, Settle-or Surrender?" (March 1986) 91
Cdn. Insurance 17.
38. Ibid 18.
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These experiences undoubtedly originate and maintain the adversary aspects
of claims negotiation and the unenthusiastic wariness of which insurance
companies and their personnel are often accused in responding to claims".
Thompson was also keen to point out the difference between private insurers'
methods and "the enormously costly aberrations apparent in federal and pro-
vincial social welfare programmes." The point was well-taken since one
means by which private plans maintain lower costs is by not indexing benefits
to inflation, unlike public schemes, which are regularly adjusted. Yet it is hard
to find any expression of concern in the insurance industry that permanently
disabled claimants might therefore be condemned to a steadily declining
standard of living.
There is more to the insurance industry's approach to claims: in their own
terminology they refer to a claim payment as a "loss." Health insurers report
their "earned loss ratio" as the ratio of claims and adjusting expenses paid,
relative to the premiums earned. The inaccuracy of this description can best
be understood by recalling that an insurance company is fundamentally a
financial institution: if its actuarial calculations are correct, an insurer should
not pay out any more in claims than it earns in premiums and therefore no
more runs a loss than a bank whose clients withdraw as much money as they
deposit. By the time individual claims are paid, the company has had the
opportunity to earn its profits through the investment of premiums. More-
over, the reported figure for claims established each year actually includes a
reserve for payments in all future years, on which the company then earns
interest.39
The financial counterpart to Thompson's philosophy of claims processing was
offered by Daniel Damov, president and chief executive officer of the Travel-
ers Life Insurance Co. of Canada in a 1987 speech to his colleagues.
"Think of the fact that on most group lines, over 90 per cent of premiums are
paid in losses and that the expected profit margin may be one per cent or less.
It means that if losses are overpaid by one percentage point, this wipes out the
profit. And how much is one per cent? Well, it could be one week, more or
less, on a two-year disability claim. It could be 75 cents on a prescription drug
claim for $75.00, and so on."40
39. G. N. Watson and B. R. Ouimet, "Elements of Group Insurance," in CLU Textbook
Library (Don Mills: The Institute of Chartered Life Underwriters of Canada, 1984)
at 6-11.
40. D. Damov, "Is Group Insurance in Canada Profitable?" (1987) 8 Cdn. J. of Life
Insurance 19 at 21.
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Damov explained his company had "alerted the entire organization to pay
close attention to the responsibility of loss management." His speech makes it
clear where the description of an approved claim as a "loss" must lead: profits
can only be maintained at the expense of the beneficiaries. A week of benefits
for a disabled person is not her right under the policy, but an attack on the
insurer's profitability and should, if possible, be avoided.
Even if one were to accept Damov's and the industry's formulation that claims
paid are "paid in losses," the total "earned profit" for publicly-traded Canadian
accident and sickness insurers in 1990 remained very healthy at 10.08 percent.
This means that $389.6 million of the $3.5 billion they earned in premiums
was left over after they had paid all the claims, including reserves for future
benefits. The companies also earned a further $613.7 million in investment
income. The break-down for privately-held insurers is not available, but the
industry as a whole earned over $5 billion in premiums while paying out only
$4.3 billion in benefits in 1990.41
V. CLAIMS MANAGEMENT FOR BEGINNERS:
THE ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER
Standing between the insurers and the individual beneficiaries is another actor
involved in the administration of group plans: the employer. Insurers actively
seek to involve employers, beginning by almost invariably requiring them to
contribute to the premiums.
For both the disabled worker and the public purse, the consequences of this
requirement are perverse: employer contributions to a private health insurance
plan are always deductible as a business expense, but for employees they are
neither taxable nor deductible at the time the premium is paid. So long as the
employer has contributed any part of the premium, however, benefits become
taxable when paid to disabled workers, who only then may deduct their
previous contributions to the plan (unadjusted for inflation).42
Given the unfortunate tax consequences for employees and employers' desire
to avoid spending money, one might well wonder why employer premium
contributions are required at all. An underwriter's textbook explains that they
help make the plan more economically attractive to employees less likely to
41. "1990 Accident and Sickness Results," 58 Cdn. Underwriter (June 1991) 40 at 40;
Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, Canadian Life and Health Insur-
ance Facts (Toronto, 1991) at 45.
42. Income TaxAct, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.63., ss.6(1)(f), 118.3(1).
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benefit from it, absorb cost fluctuations from year to year, but most
importantly:
"[Contributions] give the employer a financial stake in the plan. This will
ensure his active interest in the operation of the plan. Not only will this tend
to ensure careful and proper administration, which is important for the success
of any plan, but it will help to eliminate abuses of the plan by certain
employees."
43
Giving the employer as "active" an interest as the insurer in the policy, then,
means establishing it as an intermediary to discourage claims.
A number of cases suggest employers can obstruct a disabled worker's claims
as readily as the insurer: A case currently under litigation by Parkdale Commu-
nity Legal Services alleges Mount Sinai Hospital is liable to a nursing assistant
whom it repeatedly failed to provide with an application for a private insurer's
long-term disability benefits, during a five-year period when it had proof of
her condition. 44 In Tarailo v. Allied Chemicals Ltd., 45 the Ontario High Court
of Justice held an employer liable to an employee after it discharged him
because of unacceptable behaviour caused by his mental illness, but failed to
assist him in making a claim for long-term disability benefits under its group
plan.
The courts have also found insurers vicariously liable for employers' conduct,
which can be advantageous for employees who actually reach court. In Tarailo
the insurer was found equally liable with the employer whom it had made its
agent for the completion of claims forms, but who did not even have a copy of
the master policy available.46 In London Life Insurance Co. v. Baker,47 the
employer both mistakenly collected premiums from the claimant before he
was eligible for coverage and assured him he was covered during a lay-off
longer than allowed under the policy. The court held the plaintiff employee
was covered because the employer, a family-owned firm with only five
43. Supra, note 39 at 6-13.
44. Statement of Claim, Maria Dimov v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company and
Mount Sinai Hospital (20 December 1991), Ontario Court (General Division), Court
File No. 91-CQ-11778.
45. (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 288 (H.CJ.), which followed Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Taylor-Read Enterprises (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 653 (B.C.S.C.). An appeal of the
decision in Tarailo was settled on consent: (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 318.
46. Ibid at 297, 302.
47. (1987), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (N.S.C.A.).
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seasonal employees, was poorly informed about group insurance by London
Life's representative.
But given their role as poorly informed agents, it is at least as likely that
employers will actively but mistakenly discourage employees from seeking
benefits to which they are entitled, as they will mistakenly attempt to provide
benefits to which employees are not entitled. Even if the courts have not
generally allowed the insurers to shift their liability to the employers, 48 the
cases demonstrate they have shifted the responsibility for claims administra-
tion, with sometimes damaging results.
VI. REDUCING RISKS AND PAYMENTS:
ACCESS TO PRIvATE DISABILITY BENEFITS
1. The contract
Claims "negotiation" and "loss management" are not the only ways in which
the insurance companies maintain their profitability: they have always de-
signed contracts to keep their liability to a minimum.
"Confinement clauses" were common in the past and set stringent conditions
that allowed insurers to cancel benefits when they were not met. Typically,
they required something such as a "disability.., which confines the Insured
continuously within doors and requires regular visits therein by [a] legally
qualified physician." 49 A claimant who had to leave the house to see his doctor
and went out for short walks was no longer "necessarily, strictly and continu-
ously confined to his house" and no longer entitled to benefits.50 Their effect
appears to have been severe enough that since 1973, under statute, confine-
ment clauses are no longer binding on the insured in Ontario.
5 1
48. Richard B. Hayles predicts "no court will exonerate an insurer in an actual case" of
error by a group insurance intermediary "because of the harsh effect such a decision
would have on the employee beneficiary" if the employer could not provide the ben-
efits: "Group Insurance: Agency Status of the Master Policyholder" (1991-2) 3
C.I.L.R. 305 at 313.
49. Kruger v. Mutual Benefit Health andAccidentAssociation, [1944] O.R. 157 (C.A.).
50. Continental Casualty Company v. Roberge, [1955] S.C.R. 576 (my translation of
the clause from the French).
51. Incredibly, even after this amendment the Court upheld a confinement clause in a
contract continuously renewed between 1955 and 1976: Zappone v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co., [1983] I.L.R. 1-1708 (Ont. S.C.), [1987] I.L.R. 1-2145 (Ont.
C.A.).
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Currently, the most important use of contracts is to restrict access to disability
insurance. Insurers simply refuse to insure entire classes of workers whose
occupations they believe are too hazardous. For instance, an underwriter's
textbook on group insurance suggests they should decline to provide accident
and sickness plans to groups of employees working for hospitals and sana-
toriums or for taxicab companies.
52
After discovering in the late 1980s that about 25 percent of claims on in-
dividual policies were based on "burnout and nervous breakdown," Con-
stellation Assurance Company began screening out professionals with
"possible stress, combined with a dicey blood chemistry test" which would
suggest drug abuse. A vice-president of the company explained it was "too
difficult to exclude these conditions on the policy itself...."5 3
But insurers often rely on exclusionary clauses to exclude certain members
from group disability benefits. A person with AIDS complained to the
Ontario Human Rights Commission that his employer's group plan from
North American Life, which excluded conditions treated during the first 90
days of employment (a standard clause particularly in contracts with small
groups), was effective discrimination on the basis of a handicap. But a Board
of Inquiry upheld the exclusion as reasonable and bona fide because the
discrimination was based on "sound insurance practice. '54
The Board of Inquiry upheld the clause because its aim was to prevent adverse
selection of the plan by those most likely to need its benefits, a danger it held
was probably higher among small groups, even though North American Life
failed to make a statistically viable case for the clause's success in achieving
that aim. The decision also held that the clause reduced the potential risk to
which the insurer was exposed. Not surprisingly, none of nine alternatives
proposed by the complainant was found to fully replace these legitimate aims.
Curiously, however, the decision held that the clause should not apply so as to
exclude coverage for those with pre-existing handicaps whose increased risk
to the insurer was not as "lamentably high and substantial" as that resulting
from an HIV infection.
Adverse or anti-selection-where group members are allowed to pick the
coverage most beneficial to themselves-has always been something under-
52. Supra, note 39 at 6-20.
53. As cited in Betty Lee, "Planning for Disaster" (July 1989) 62 Cdn. Business 71 at 75.
54. "Exclusion from coverage of pre-existing handicap ruled not discriminatory"
(November 1992) 12 Decisions (Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association) 6
at 7-8; "Insurance-AIDS" (1 December 1992) Canadian Press Newstex.
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writers were instructed to avoid when writing group policies. 55 A lawyer for
North American Life commented during the complaint's investigation, that an
order to provide coverage to those already ill "would undermine the whole
basis of insurance as a risk selection process."'56 But "risk selection process" is
merely another way of expressing the exclusion from group coverage of
precisely those individuals most likely to need an insurance plan's benefits.5
7
By recognizing this practice as "reasonable and bona fide," the Board of
Inquiry's decision (currently under appeal) upheld selection as a privilege
exclusively reserved for insurers.
Finally, the contract almost invariably limits the insurer's potential liability to
a claimant through the "all-source maximum." Under this standard provision,
not only are payments to the disabled worker limited to a fixed dollar amount,
but her replacement income including all other sources may not be more than
a fixed percentage of pre-disability earnings (generally 85 percent of gross or
75 percent of after-tax earnings). 58 If necessary, payments by the insurer will
be reduced to ensure the total amount of disability income remains at this limit.
As two industry consultants recently pointed out, this means that even an
employee who collects from the plan "will have paid a premium for a benefit
amount that will never be received....-59
2. The State as primary payer
Disability insurers also maintain their profits by exploiting public programs:
contracts usually include clauses providing for the deduction from a claimant's
benefits of any payments received under plans such as Workers' Compensa-
tion or CPP. These are the other sources the all-source maximum is generally
meant to catch.
55. Supra, note 39 at 2-3.
56. As cited in N. Bramm, "Untrodden Paths" (October 1991) 15 Benefits Canada 11 at 11.
57. Another lawyer for North American Life, showing more colour than tact, told the
press: "You can't insure a burning building." See: "AIDS-Firing," (7 January
1992) Canadian Press Newstex.
58. An intriguing use was recently made of the all-source maximum in a case currently
under appeal: the plaintiff successfully argued her CPP benefits should not be
deducted from her disability insurance payments until the two together reached the
all-source maximum of 80 per cent, even though the insurance benefits were fixed at
only 70 per cent of pre-disability earnings. See: Jones v. Confederation Life Insur-
ance (23 October 1992) (Nfld. S.C.T.D.), [Unreported].
59. A. Kyle and D. Thibeault, "Opposing Forces" (July-August 1991) 15 Benefits Can-
ada 18 at 19.
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As a result of these deductions, public plans end up as the primary payer while
private insurers merely "top up" claimants' benefits. Insurers actively encour-
age claimants to apply for CPP disability benefits,60 though they do not
increase their income at all. 61 Since many private plans pay no more than
two-thirds of the claimant's previous earnings, while Workers' Compensation
in Ontario, for instance, pays up to 90 percent, it is quite possible for an insurer
to owe no money at all to disabled group members.
The well-known case of Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.62 shows that
insurers are not above designing plans so as to shift the total burden to
public plans, even if the result is reduced benefits to group members. In
Brooks, the employer's group plan provided short-term disability benefits,
but excluded pregnant women during a seventeen-week period in which
they would be entitled to (less generous) Unemployment Insurance mater-
nity benefits. The Supreme Court held in a unanimous judgment that this
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex under the Manitoba Human
Rights Code and that the pregnant women were entitled to the private
plan's benefits.
The private insurers' self-assigned role as second payer also allowed them to
profit from inflation. As public benefits such as CPP disability and Workers'
Compensation increased to keep up with inflation, they made up a steadily
larger amount of the fixed total benefit guaranteed under private plans, so that
the portion paid by private insurers steadily declined. The result was that as
beneficiaries' real income decreased due to inflation, so the insurer's obliga-
tion to them also decreased both in real terms and absolutely.
The Association of Superintendents of Insurance of the Provinces of Canada
became aware of this problem, but decided not to deal with it through any
amendments to their Uniform Accident and Sickness Insurance Act, which is
in force in slightly different forms in all common law provinces. Instead, they
added a provision to their non-binding guidelines, effective January 1, 1978,
that disability insurance benefits should "not be reduced because of a govern-
ment sponsored plan or support program cost-of-living adjustment," except
60. The claimant admitted he was only before the Board at his insurer's insistance in
Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Brown (1989), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8579
(Can. Pen. App. Bd.).
61. According to one doctor, his widowed patient's successful application for CPP dis-
ability benefits (made at the insurer's suggestion) actually reduced her CPP
survivor's benefits: D. C.. Symington, "Mary, Mary and a Quite Contrary Sys-
tem"(Spring 1988) 19 Rehabilitation Digest 3 at 4.
62. [19891 1 S.C.R. 1219.
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where the private benefits were adjusted by at least the same amount.63 There
is some evidence that this provision has been largely followed in the indus-
try,64 but at best it ensures only an indexation of the portion of benefits paid by
a public plan.
Representatives of the insurance industry have in any case indicated publicly
that they welcome the erosion of benefits by inflation because it prevents
"malingering." In 1977, Roland Nelson, a vice-president of Travelers Insur-
ance speaking on behalf of the Canadian Association of Accident and Sickness
Insurers, told a meeting of provincial Superintendents of Insurance:
"There is complete agreement within the industry that the problem of overin-
surance is very real, i.e., when an individual has available disability benefits
which in the aggregate are sufficient to induce him to go on claim and/or
cause him to stay on claim longer than would normally be required in the
circumstances. The problem must be addressed.
Companies attempt to avoid overinsurance through the application of tables
showing the maximum amount of benefits they will issue to applicants with
various earned incomes. These are made complicated by their efforts to reflect
the impact of various government benefits. These practices, however, provide
no protection against overinsurance created by the addition of new benefits or
the increase of existing benefits subsequent to issue.
Companies have come to rely to some extent on the impact of inflation to ease
the effects of overinsurance. In an inflationary economy, the income require-
ments of the insured will increase rapidly and eventually the overinsurance
aspect of level benefit payments will tend to disappear. This control will
disappear if the rate of inflation can be returned to an acceptable level." 65
63. Association of Provincial Superintendents of Insurance, "Guidelines Governing Group
Accident Insurance and Group Sickness Insurance," cited in G. N. Watson and B. R.
Ouimet, "Elements of Group Insurance," in CLU Textbook Library (Don Mills: The
Institute of Chartered Life Underwriters of Canada, 1984) at D-7.
64. A specimen contract in G. N. Watson and B. R. Ouimet, Elements of Group Insur-
ance, 1989 ed. (Don Mills: Life Underwriters Association of Canada, 1989) at A-27
provides that income from the QPP or CPP disability benefits will be a direct offset
from the amount of long term disability insurance payable, but "any increase in the
disability benefit under the Quebec/Canada Pension plan because of an automatic
adjustment in the cost of living index.., is not considered income for the purpose of
determining the amount payable."
65. Association of Superintendents of Insurance of the Province of Canada, Minutes of
the Proceedings of the Sixty-First Annual Conference (Toronto: Office of the Secre-
tary, 1978) at 123-24.
(1993) 9 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
Obsessed as they are with the dangers "if overinsurance and voluntarily
prolonged disability become prevalent," the insurers are therefore content to
allow the incomes of the disabled to be eroded by inflation at a pace slowed
only by the indexation of public schemes.
The public subsidization of private insurers reached new heights in 1987 when
the federal government increased Canada Pension Plan disability benefits by
$152. At the time Parliament debated the change in 1986, concerns were raised
that it would allow private insurers to reduce their payments. But the Minister
of Health and Welfare, Jake Epp, said he had dealt with the problem through
an arrangement with the Canadian Health and Life Insurance Association.
Only a few months later, however, a government Member of Parliament
complained in the House of Commons that a constituent employed by George
Weston Ltd. had seen her disability benefits under a plan from London Life
reduced by an amount equal to the CPP increase.66
Epp insisted this was exceptional and that in "98 percent of all contracts" the
increase had been passed on to beneficiaries. However, a spokesman for
London Life reported that the reduction in benefits to Weston's employees
was the result of a standard provision in disability insurance contracts. Said
Jim Etherington: "We're the innocent party, we approached all our clients
and asked what they would do. Weston said 'we'll stick to the contract.' 67
Since most private disability insurance plans set a flat maximum level of
benefits from all sources, 68 most contracts would have required a specific
change to that amount in order to pass on the increase. Both the Guidelines
from the Association of Provincial Superintendents of Insurance and an exam-
ple of a standard contract in an insurance industry textbook forbid the offset-
ting only of cost-of-living adjustments to QPP or CPP disability benefits, not
lump sum increases. It therefore seems likely many insurers simply cut bene-
fits by the increase to CPP.69 As London Life's spokesperson pointed out, the
government could have dealt with the entire problem through legislation,
rather than asking insurers to request changes to their clients' individual
contracts. 70
66. "Par-Disability" (31 March 1987) Canadian Press Newstex.
67. Ibid.
68. Supra, note 64 at A-27.
69. This is the conclusion of H. Beatty in "Comprehensive Disability Compensation in
Ontario: Towards an Agenda," (1991) 7 J. L & Social Pol'y 100 at 137.
70. Supra, note 66.
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Epp later reported full compliance with his request, outside of a group of some
15 to 20 companies and unions (such as George Weston Ltd.) with self-insured
plans, under which benefits were administered by an insurance company but
guaranteed by the employer.71 More recently, however, officials at Health and
Welfare Canada's Income Security Programs division have admitted that Epp
did not take any steps to monitor the level of compliance with what was merely
a voluntary policy of the Canadian Health and Life Insurance Association, nor
did the CLHIA itself monitor compliance by its members.72
VII LEAVING WELL ENOUGH ALONE:
THE REGULATION OF DISABILITY INSURANCE
The fact that the Superintendents of Insurance offered no disagreement when
a vice-president of Travelers Insurance expressed his pleasure that inflation
eroded benefits (as cited above) shows the extent of their "regulatory capture"
by the industry. After these remarks, the Quebec Superintendent, Jacques Roy,
firmly agreed overinsurance represented a serious problem and suggested a
"solution" would have to begin with the principle "that government programs
should be first payers." 73
Assuring private insurers the status of secondary payers is consistent with a
1977 study of life insurance regulation in Canada, which concluded that the
purpose of government regulation has always been to secure the solvency of
insurers so they could accumulate policy-holders' savings and channel them
71. S. Kerstetter, "Disability" (12 May 1987) Canadian Press Newstex. It is difficult to
believe the problem stemmed from self-insured plans (under which benefits are
administered by an insurance company but guaranteed by the employer) since a rep-
resentative of insurance managers at 220 of Canada's 500 largest corporations
reported in 1980 that all of their long-term plans were guaranteed by insurers and
they self-insured only short-term disability benefits; Association of Superintendents
of Insurance of the Provinces of Canada, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Sixty-
ThirdAnnual Conference (Toronto: Office of the Secretary, 1980) at 126.
72. Letter from Monique Plante, Assistant Deputy Minister, Health and Welfare Canada
to David Schulze, 12 January 1993. Plante commented that the CLHIA reported
"very few, if any, complaints on this issue" which it felt "may be a strong indication
that the policy in question was widely implemented." She continued: "It is interest-
ing to note that Health and Welfare received very few complaints as well."
73. Supra. note 65 at 125, 126. This view seems to be shared by the federal govern-
ment, which announced plans to amend the Canada Pension Plan Act to allow ben-
efits to be assigned directly to insurance companies, in order to solve their problems
collecting from disabled workers: Monica Townson, "Your Money Q&A: How
public service disability benefits integrate with CPP" (23 September 1992) Finan-
cial Post 18.
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for long-term investments, "with little regard being paid to fair treatment of the
consumers." 74
The same study was unable to find a single prosecution under the section of
Ontario's Insurance Act prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices,
though cases of prohibited practices could be found in the law reports. At the
time, the Superintendent of Insurance explained no action had been suffi-
ciently serious to warrant a prosecution. Citing two cases in which the Super-
intendent had actually supported companies in cutting off benefits under
accident and sickness policies, though the facts suggested the beneficiary had
a good cause of action, the study concluded the Superintendent was simply not
interested in exercising his powers.75
When the Association of Superintendents of Insurance proposed amendments
to The Uniform Life andAccident Sickness Insurance Acts, which would have
required insurers to disclose more information to group plan beneficiaries, the
companies mounted an effective lobby against the changes. The insurers'
approach on this issue has been consistent: they are responsible for collecting
employees' premiums, but not for ensuring they are properly informed about
the plan. Over four years, they presented objection after objection, even to the
point of claiming the heavy cost of the customized printing of information for
each plan's beneficiaries would increase the cost of coverage.76 The amend-
ments eventually dwindled from a responsibility by the insurer to deliver
detailed information on the plan to each group member to merely providing
certificates to the employer in sufficient quantity for distribution.77 A recent
discussion paper by the Insurance Commission of Ontario continues this
compliant approach by calling merely for a right to inspect the policy or to
obtain a copy "on payment of reasonable fees."
78
74. G. Tumwine-Mukubwa, A History 6f Life Insurance Regulation in Canada, 1868-
1976 (LL.M. thesis, York University, 1977) at 164.
75. Ibid. at 152-54. In a 1986 interview, Manitoba's Superintendent of Insurance
admitted he believed moral suasion was more effective than legal action in regulat-
ing the industry; James Fleming, Merchants of Fear: An Investigation of Canada's
Insurance Industry (Markham: Penguin Books, 1986) at 382.
76. Supra, note 65 at 107.
77. Association of Superintendents of Insurance of the Provinces of Canada, Minutes of
Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Conference (Toronto: Office of the Secretary,
1977) at 95; Blair Fraser, ed., The Uniform Life andAccident & Sickness Insurance
Acts, rev. ed. (Toronto: Stone & Cox, 1983) at 48.
78. Report of the Insurance Legislation Review Project to the Ontario Insurance Com-
mission, Insuring for the Future: Modern Insurance Legislation for Ontario (May
1991) at 145.
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The final amendments to the The Uniform Life and Accident & Sickness
Insurance Acts also left out a proposed provision that, when a plan was
terminated without replacement, group members would be entitled to benefits
until they were informed of this by the insurer. Industry representatives called
it "unfair and improper to require the insurer to be held liable [for] responsibil-
ities beyond their control," while forcing employers to provide proper infor-
mation was "a government responsibility." The best solution, suggested
Robert G. Mepham, a vice-president of London Life, was simply to assume
beneficiaries were informed: "When salary cheques stop coming, an employee
should surely be deemed to know that his group insurance benefits have also
terminated." Once again these comments passed without objections from the
Superintendents of Insurance.
79
Until recently, human rights commissions have been little better at regulating
the industry. Brooks v. Canada Safeway8o was an appeal of a decision by
Manitoba's commission that a benefits plan excluding pregnant women from
certain benefits did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. The
Ontario Human Rights Commission reached settlements in two cases of dis-
crimination by insurers whose group plans offered 24 months of benefits to
those with physical disabilities but only 12 months of coverage to those with a
mental disability. When it settled the first complaint against Confederation
Life in 1990, the commission said the provision was "commonly used in the
industry" and announced it would address the problem industry-wide. How-
ever, no action appears to have been taken by the time a similar complaint
against Great-West Life was settled a year later and Chief Commissioner
Catherine Frazee merely said she would write to insurers "urging" them to
delete the exclusionary clause from their contracts.81
VII. PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM
This paper has presented evidence that private disability insurance is philo-
sophically at odds with equitable income replacement, which alone should be
reason enough to abolish it. It is also inevitably selective and therefore incapa-
ble of providing anything approaching universal insurance. As Terence Ison
succinctly put it: "If it is right that what people want and need is income
insurance that will provide for the duration of a disability, income at a level not
79. Supra, note 65 at 118.
80. Supra, note 62.
81. C. Lakshman, "Insurers told to end biased policies," Financial Post (7 November
1991) 3.
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too far below the level of lost earnings, this type of insurance can only be made
universally available through a social insurance system."
82
The problem is not to make the case for a public comprehensive disability
insurance program. It has been recommended for Ontario in three separate
reports in seven years: by the Legislative Assembly's Select Committee on
Company Law in 1981, by Paul Weiler in his inquiry into Workers' Compen-
sation in 1983, and by the Social Assistance Review Committee in 1988.83 It
was also endorsed federally by the House of Commons Special Committee on
the Disabled and the Handicapped in 1981, for Manitoba in a government
white paper in 1977 and for Saskatchewan by a special committee in 1976.84
Unfortunately, action on these reports has been noticeable by its absence, and
the report of a joint federal-provincial committee study of a comprehensive
disability protection program remains unpublished, though it apparently rec-
ommended only minor reforms. 85
The current New Democratic Party government in Ontario struck an inter-
ministerial task force on universal disability insurance in 1991, which had not
reported at the time of this writing, and Workers' Compensation Board chair
Odoardo Di Santo has publicly called for the creation of such a program to
supplement benefits from the Board. 86 However, given the Ontario govern-
ment's decision not to take over what would be an essential element in a
comprehensive disability program-automobile insurance--a review of pos-
sibilities for short-term reform still appears in order.
82. T. G. Ison, Human Disability and Personal Income (Kingston: Industrial Relations
Centre, 1978) at 5.
83. Ontario, Select Committee on Company Law, The Insurance Industry; Fifth Report
on Accident and Sickness Insurance (Toronto: Legislative Assembly, 1981); Paul
C. Weiler, Protecting the Worker from Disability: Challenges for the Eighties
(Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 1983); Ontario, Social Assistance Review Commit-
tee, Transitions (Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1988). The
case has also been made more recently by H. Beatty in "Comprehensive Disability
Compensation in Ontario: Towards an Agenda," (1991) 7 J. L & Social Pol'y 100.
84. Canada, Special Committee on the Disabled and the Handicapped, Obstacles: Third
Report (Ottawa: House of Commons, 1981) at 53; Manitoba, Accident and Sickness
Compensation in Manitoba: A Government White Paper (Winnipeg: Queen's
Printer, 1977); Saskatchewan, Report of the Sickness and Accident Insurance Com-
mittee, ([Regina]: [Department of Labour?], 1976).
85. L. Muszynski, "An idea whose time has come: Universal disability insurance should
replace an irrational and unfair system," (Spring 1989) 13 Perception 55 at 56.
86. B. Reno, "Reforming WCB" (April 1993) The New Ontario Democrat 22.
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On the surface, the Insurance Commission of Ontario appears to have powers
wide-ranging enough to change the industry's way of doing business. The
InsuranceAct's prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts and practices includes
not just the failure to respect provisions of the Act and a number of specific
practices, but also "any conduct resulting in unreasonable delay or resistance
to the fair adjustment and settlement of claims." 87 The Superintendent (the
Commission's chief administrative officer) may investigate such practices and
order any person engaging in them to cease, to leave the business of insurance,
or to perform acts she judges necessary to remedy the situation.
However, even this part of the Act is weighted in favour of insurers: the
Superintendent's power to investigate and make orders is entirely discretion-
ary, so that beneficiaries of insurance have no statutory right to complain nor
to demand a hearing. By contrast, those engaged in unfair practices against
whom the Superintendent is contemplating an order have a right to notice, to a
hearing before her, to an appeal to the Commissioner, and to a stay of any
decision pending judicial review.88 Given the insurance industry's willingness
to fund long-term litigation, prosecutions do not seem a promising way to
change the treatment of disabled clainfants.
A far simpler means would be to provide better mechanisms for complaints
and appeal. This could in fact be implemented fairly easily in Ontario since the
Insurance Act allows the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council to make regulations
"governing group insurance contracts or schemes, or any class thereof includ-
ing prescribing and regulating their terms and conditions, qualifications for
membership in groups and regulating the marketing of group insurance con-
tracts or schemes."'89
Currently, the regulation of group insurance is an afterthought to The Uniform
Accident Sickness Insurance Act, produced by the Association of Superinten-
dents of Insurance of the Provinces of Canada: provisions to regulate it were
not even introduced until 1970.90 The result has been that through statutory
87. R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, s.438(i).
88. Ibid. ss. 438, 439, 441, 18, 20.
89. Ibid. s.121.
90. B. Fraser, ed., The Uniform Life and Accident & Sickness Insurance Acts, rev. ed.
(Toronto: Stone & Cox, 1983) at 43. The delay is partly a reflection of the predomi-
nance of life insurance concerns in accident and sickness insurance regulation:
while group plans have outnumbered individual health policies in Canada since at
least 1950, group life insurance policy ownership did not begin to dominate the mar-
ket until the early 1970s; Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, Cana-
dian Life and Health Insurance Facts (Toronto, 1991) at 14, 48.
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conditions, beneficiaries of individual policies receive somewhat better pro-
tection than those in group plans: failure to give notice of claim within the
prescribed time (90 days) does not invalidate the claim if it is provided "as
soon as reasonably possible"; the insurer must provide forms for proof of
claim within 15 days of notice and pay initial benefits for loss of time within
30 days. 91 There is no reason why these should not be immediately extended
to group policies.
A number of conditions imposed on automobile insurance policies as part of
the no-fault benefits, which are provided to those who sustain "physical,
psychological or mental injury as a result of an accident", could also usefully
be imported into the regulation of accident and sickness insurance. It is
difficult to see why the beneficiaries of disability insurance currently receive
less generous treatment from the law than those injured in automobile acci-
dents, even though they too are usually indemnified without regard to fault.
Under the No-Fault Benefits Schedule92, automobile insurers may deduct
benefits under other plans from their payments, but they must pay full benefits
until the claimant actually receives them; in addition, neither social assistance
nor Workers' Compensation benefits may be deducted from them under the
Act. 93 This effectively discourages tardy claims processing and the use of
social assistance as a public subsidy for delays. In addition, the Schedule
provides specific time limits for making payments and penalizes delays at the
rate of two percent interest per month, payable to the claimant, providing a
clear financial incentive for proper claims processing. 94
The Schedule also explicitly states that a failure to give notice of a claim
within the set time limits does not invalidate it, if the person "has a reasonable
excuse" and files within two years of the accident. 95 By contrast, the
Insurance Act imposes a one-year limitation period as a statutory provision in
individual disability insurance policies96 and, while the Act is silent on group
policies, the same provision is commonly added by insurers.
91. R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8, s. 300.
92. No-Fault Benefit Schedule, 0. Reg 273/90.
93. Supra, note 12, s.267.
94. 0. Reg 273/90, s.24.
95. Ibid. s.22(2).
96. R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, s.300, Statutory Conditions No. 12, but under s.301(b) the period
may be lengthened at the Court's discretion. This provision is adopted from the
Uniform Act and is found in all common law jurisdictions except the Yukon and
Northwest Territories, where the period is two years.
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Limitation periods do not actually bar claims completely. Instead, the courts
have held:
"Causes of action for the recovery of ongoing payments, such as income-
replacement benefits under no-fault auto insurance or accident and sickness
insurance, continually renew themselves each time an instalment becomes
payable because the insurer is under a continuing liability for each succeeding
benefit."97
The limitation is therefore only on the period in the past for which benefits can
be claimed.
But the practical effect of limitation periods is to reward insurance companies
for delay when dealing with terminated claims: after 12 months, every day a
former claimant spends pursuing any process other than legal action is a day of
benefits the insurer will not have to pay. There is no reason why a normal
limitation period of six years should not apply to disability insurance policies,
as it does to most other contracts. If anything, the depression that can chara-
cterize disability and is often exacerbated by the termination of benefits,
argues for a longer limitation period.
The 1990 amendments to the Insurance Act also made a special dispute-reso-
lution mechanism available to beneficiaries of the automobile no-fault provis-
ions. Either the insured person or the insurer may refer any matter regarding
entitlement to no-fault benefits to a mediator, on application to the Insurance
Commission. If mediation fails, the insured person may either bring a court
proceeding or ask the Commission to appoint an arbitrator, whose decision can
be further appealed to the Director of Arbitrations. Pending the outcome of
either proceeding, the insurer must pay its last offer of settlement to the
beneficiary.98
While it will be necessary to study the experience of automobile insurance
claimants under dispute resolution, it is difficult to imagine how it could be
less effective than traditional litigation for accident and sickness insurance.
Currently, the courts are the scene of repeated findings of fact as to states
of disability, in which questions of law are usually of minor importance.,
Any danger which might exist of mediators encouraging settlements for
less than the full claim is probably no greater than that posed by average
legal representation.
97. C. Brown and J. Menezes, Insurance Law in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1991) at
240. See, for instance, Zappone v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., [1983] I.L.R.
1-1708 (Ont. S.C.).
98. Supra, note 12, ss.279-284.
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With mediation, pre-trial negotiations between claimants and insurers could
take place within a formal structure and with a written record, but without the
initial expense of legal counsel. The obligation of the insurer to pay its last
settlement offer (assuming there is one) pending litigation or arbitration might
actually provide the necessary financial resources for claimants determined to
proceed. More importantly, the provision means claimants may continue their
financial lives in the interim and would help to remove the insurance
companies' "veto" on rehabilitation that Justice Coulter Osborne decried in the
case of automobile accident disability benefits. 99
A similar change would be to provide that all disability policies are incorpo-
rated by reference into any collective agreement which provides that workers
shall receive their benefits. Currently, a unionized worker can grieve the right
to benefits only when the plan itself is part of her collective agreement. If the
employer's obligation is simply to provide insurance coverage, then employ-
ees must pursue individual claims against the insurer in court. 1°° Making all
unionized workers' claims subject to the jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators
would give them inexpensive access to a less formal process. Such a change
would, of course, have to provide that, in case of any disagreement, the
provisions of the collective agreement would take precedence over those of the
policy so as to provide workers with exactly the coverage for which they
bargained.10
Unions should also be assigned a continuing obligation to represent claimants
in respect to the plan, even after they have ceased being dues-paying members
because of their disability, a responsibility which many currently avoid. At the
same time, given the life-long importance to individual recipients of the right
to benefits created by collective agreement, it might be advisable to make
grievance arbitration a non-exclusive procedure in order also to provide union-
ized disabled workers with access to an individual mediation process and to
the courts.
99. Supra, note 11 at 163.
100. See for instance, Re Molson's Brewery (Ont.) Ltd and B.F.C.S.D., Loc. 304 (1978),
17 L.A.C. (2d) 354 (Ont. Arb. Bd.).
101. If this change were implemented through the Insurance Act, rather than labour rela-
tions legislation, it would be a statute of general application which would also cover
federally-regulated employees.
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IX. AFTERWORD
Whatever minor advances may be possible through improved regulation,
advocates for disabled workers should be aware of the need for constant
vigilance when dealing with private insurers. The evidence suggests they
cannot be relied upon to conduct themselves to the advantage of their
claimants.
To give one more example: in a 1990 article in Canadian Underwriter, two
accountants who work with disability insurance companies warned that "in
many cases, files receive a cursory review by an inadequately trained under-
writer" and "one of the most common causes of error related to this type of
financial underwriting is miscalculation of earned income." 102 Their their
concern was not undercompensated beneficiaries, but rather that these
practices "can lead to over-insuring, inaccurate applications and unnecessarily
high payouts."10 3 Disabled workers will always have to be wary of an industry
more anxious to guard against overcompensated beneficiaries than to ensuring
that its own defects do not lead to underinsurance and insufficient payments to
the claimants it is meant to support.
102. Paul Dunnett and Stewart Katz, "Growing pains afflict disability insurance"
(September 1990) 57 Cdn. Underwriter 65.
103. Ibid. 66.
